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I. MORTGAGES AND FORECLOSURES
801 Nolana, Inc. v. RTC Mortgage Trust 1994-S6,1 deals with assign-
ments of rents as additional collateral for loans. In connection with two
loans, Nolana executed assignments of rents in favor of the RTC's prede-
cessor. The assignments were the typical "absolute" assignments of the
type commonly seen in financial transactions involving real property.
The assignments provided, among other things, that the assignment of
rent "is intended to be absolute, unconditional and presently effective."'2
They provided that it would not be necessary to institute legal proceed-
ings to enforce the assignments. They also provided that, until notice was
received from the lender to turn over the rents, the rents could be paid to
the borrower for use in accordance with the terms of the assignment. The
assignments did state that they were part of the security for the loans.
Nolana defaulted on the loans. The RTC accelerated the notes and
demanded that Nolana turn over the rents. The RTC sought a TRO to
enjoin Nolana's use of the rents and sought the appointment of a receiver
to oversee the operation of the property.
In the litigation, which involved more matters than the assignment of
rents, Nolana argued that the assignments of rents constituted pro tanto
repayment of its debts, that the RTC had freely elected to apply rents to
other matters, and that at all times following maturity of the debt Nolana
acted at the direction of the RTC in terms of the handling of rents, reve-
nues, and profits. The RTC argued that the assignments were collateral,
rather than absolute, and even if they were absolute, the debt had not
been discharged. The trial court held that the assignments were collateral
assignments.3
"Under Texas law, an assignment of rents may be considered either a
security pledge or an absolute transfer of title to the rents."'4 An assign-
ment of rents classified as a security pledge is bound by the common law
rule that the assignment "does not become operative until the mortgagee
obtains possession of the property, or impounds the rents, or secures the
appointment of a receiver, or takes some other similar action."'5 An "ab-
* B.A., Southern Methodist University; J.D., Southern Methodist University. Attor-
ney at law, Dallas, Texas.
1. 944 S.W.2d 751 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1997, pet. denied).
2. Id. at 755.
3. See id. at 753.
4. Id. at 754 (citing Taylor v. Brennan, 621 S.W.2d 592, 593-94 (Tex. 1981)).
5. Taylor, 621 S.W.2d at 594.
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solute" assignment, however, operates to transfer the right to rents auto-
matically upon the happening of a specified condition, such as default.6 It
is a pro tanto payment of the obligation.7 An absolute transfer of rents,
for example, may confer immediate title to the lender with the lender's
enjoyment of the rents deferred until the occurrence of some specified
condition, such as default on the loan.8
Noting the features of the assignments, that they were intended to be
absolute and that the lender was not required to take any action to en-
force them, the court of appeals held that the assignments were absolute
assignments. 9 The court noted that both absolute and collateral assign-
ments are typically given as security for a debt, and so, despite the fact
that the assignments were part of a larger loan transaction, the assign-
ment could be absolute. 10
Having granted summary judgment on the issue of whether the assign-
ment was absolute or not, the court went on to deal with the issue of
whether the assignment effected a pro tanto payment of the obligation.
Nolana argued that since the transfer of rents was an absolute transfer of
title, the transfer effected a pro tanto payment of the debt and the debt
was paid if full. The court disagreed.
While we have found that the assignments of rent were to be abso-
lute transfers of title, it is not clear that, ipso facto, 801 Nolana is
entitled to summary judgment. The terms of the assignment of rents
agreements stipulate that rental received by 801 Nolana should be
applied to the expenses of collecting the rents, then to the advertis-
ing, selling, and conveying of the property, then to the interest on the
debt, and then to the principal, but this is not evidence that the 801
Nolana actually applied the rental received accordingly.11
While the assignments provided that the rents were to be applied in cer-
tain ways after default, there was no evidence that Nolana actually ap-
plied the rents in that way. Because there was no evidence that Nolana
actually applied or delivered rents per the rental assignments, summary
6. See id.
7. See id.
8. See FDIC v. International Property Mgmt., 929 F.2d 1033, 1035 (5th Cir.1991) (ap-
plying Texas law to an assignment of rents).
9. See Nolana, 944 S.W.2d at 756.
10. See id. at 756.
Irrespective of its characterization as "security" or "absolute assignment," an
assignment of rent typically is executed pursuant to a lender's interest in be-
ing repaid. Hence, we cannot accept appellee's view that because the assign-
ment of rents agreement was part of the larger secured debt agreement
conclusively makes this rentals assignment a mere security pledge. The terms
of the agreement and deed of trust, read together, belie this characterization.
We hold that the agreements and deeds of trust here read together indicate
that the parties intended an absolute transfer of title to the rents, and that
the trial court erred in concluding that the assignments of rents were security
pledges.
Id. at 755-56.
11. Id. at 756.
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judgment on the issue of pro tanto payment could not be granted.' 2
The dissenting opinion pointed out Nolana's argument that the RTC
had permitted the rents to be used to maintain the premises, and by per-
mitting that use, was, in effect, applying whatever was used to the pay-
ment of the debt. 13 The dissent believed that the lender's forbearance of
receipt of rents should be considered just that, and not a payment of the
debt. By foregoing its right to immediate turnover of the rents under the
assignment, the creditor may not reasonably be understood to have also
abandoned its right to the amount of the underlying loan which remains
unpaid. Such an interpretation would force the lender to either demand
absolute and immediate turnover of any rental payments subject to such
an assignment or risk having the underlying debt abruptly canceled.
Jackson v. Stonebriar Partnership14 deals with a property owner's liabil-
ity to a mortgage lender for taxes after a mid-year foreclosure. In this
case, when the lender foreclosed in August, it failed to include the current
year's taxes in the bid. After the taxes became due, the lender paid them,
then sued Stonebriar, the party who had owned the property on the fore-
closure date (who had bought the property subject to the mortgage) for
reimbursement of the taxes. Apparently nothing in the mortgage docu-
ments dealt with payment of taxes after foreclosure, so the court dealt
only with the case law on the subject.
When a lender forecloses on a mortgage, he has to include the amount
of taxes in his bid if he wants to collect them.' 5 When the mortgage is
extinguished by foreclosure, the instrument is satisfied and the lender's
claims against the mortgagor are also satisfied.16 Relying on Smart v.
Tower Land & Investment Co.,17 and Wood v. Henry S. Miller Co.,18 the
court held that the mortgagee has to account for taxes in its foreclosure,
otherwise the taxes are not recoverable from the borrower.' 9
Furthermore, Texas law does not provide a foreclosing lender a right of
subrogation to the taxing authority for the amount of taxes paid after
foreclosure that relate to the time period between January 1 of a year and
the foreclosure date.
We reach this conclusion because on January 1 of each year a tax lien
attaches to property to secure the payment of all taxes, penalties, and
interest ultimately imposed for the year. Hence, January 1 becomes
the crucial date and not the dates of subsequent events mandated as
the tax collection process unfolds during the tax year. Hence, we
conclude further that the existence of the tax lien on January 1 re-
quires a mortgagee to take into account, in calculating its bid at fore-
closure, the amount of taxes attributable to the time period of
12. See id. at 757.
13. See id. at 757 (Seerden, C.J., dissenting).
14. 931 S.W.2d 635 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1996, writ denied).
15. See Stone v. Tilley, 101 S.W. 201, 202 (1907).
16. See id. at 202.
17. 597 S.W.2d 333 (Tex. 1980).
18. 597 S.W.2d 332 (Tex. 1980).
19. See Jackson, 931 S.W.2d at 638.
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January 1 to the date of foreclosure, if it expects to collect that sum.
Consequently, it follows that a mortgagee foreclosing under a deed
of trust does not have an equitable subrogation cause of action on
which the mortgagee may recover a personal judgment against that
mortgagor for taxes paid by the mortgagee either before or after
foreclosure under a deed of trust. In the present case, therefore,
Jackson and Bowie have no equitable subrogation cause of action
entitling them to recover a personal judgment against Stonebriar for
taxes paid by them after the August foreclosure. Every day in Texas,
taxes for a given year are estimated at real estate closings occurring
between January 1 and later assessment in October. Jackson and
Bowie could have done likewise at this deed of trust foreclosure.20
In Wayne Harwell Properties v. Pan American Logistics Center, Inc.,21
Vaughan and Harwell signed development agreements that included
some rights-of-first-refusal and a twenty-year assignment of a "net cash
flow" interest in the land. Browning-Ferris, Inc. (BFI), purchased the
property from Harwell. Harwell claimed that the rights under the devel-
opment agreement ran with the land and were enforceable against BFI.
In order to enforce an agreement burdening land against a successor
owner, the agreement must run with the land. The covenant can be a real
covenant or an equitable covenant.22 A real covenant is one made be-
tween parties who are in privity at the time of the covenant and is con-
tained in a grant of some property interest in the land. 23 It must touch
and concern the land, must relate to a thing in existence, or specifically
bind the parties and assigns, and must be intended to run with the land.2 4
An equitable covenant is binding against subsequent purchasers who ac-
quire the land with notice of the restriction. 25 If no privity of estate ex-
isted between the original parties, it must be shown that the restriction is
imposed for the benefit of adjacent land. Absent this showing, the cove-
nant will be construed as a personal covenant.2 6
Harwell contended that the assignment of cash flow from the land was
the conveyance of an interest in the land itself which was sufficient to
establish privity of estate. Privity of estate is a mutual or successive rela-
tionship to the same rights of property. Texas courts have held that the
conveyance of an interest in the land itself, or an easement in the land, is
necessary to create privity of estate.2 7 This court held, without discus-
sion, that an interest in the cash flow from a piece of property is not so
closely linked to the land itself that it constitutes an interest in the land.28
20. Id. at 640.
21. 945 S.W.2d 216 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1997, pet. denied).
22. See 18 TEX. JUR. 3D, COVENANTS, CONDITIONS, AND RESTRICTIONS § 8 (1981).
23. See Panhandle & S.F. Ry. v. Wiggins, 161 S.W.2d 501, 505 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Amarillo 1942, writ ref'd w.o.m.).
24. See Westland Oil Dev. Corp. v. Gulf Oil Corp., 637 S.W.2d 903, 911 (Tex. 1982).
25. See 18 TEX. JUR. 3D, COVENANTS, CONDITIONS, AND RESTRIcTIONS § 15 (1981).
26. See Davis v. Skipper, 83 S.W.2d 318, 322 (1935).
27. See Howard R. Williams, Restrictions on the Use of Land: Covenants Running with
the Land at Law, 27 TEX. L. REV. 419, 446 (1949).
28. See Wayne Harwell Properties, 945 S.W.2d at 216, 218.
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With no privity of estate, the covenant to pay cash flow did not run with
the land. 29
Marroquin v. D&N Funding, Inc. 30 is a case which represents a terrible
waste of judicial resources (and, no doubt, the client's money). The Mar-
roquins continued to live in their house after it was foreclosed on. Before
the lender took any action to evict the Marroquins, Mrs. Marroquin filed
bankruptcy. With no knowledge of the bankruptcy, the lender filed a for-
cible detainer action to evict the Marroquins. The Marroquins sought
and obtained a temporary restraining order against the forcible detainer
proceeding. Initially the Marroquins did not inform the district court of
the pending bankruptcy. At the temporary injunction hearing, the Mar-
roquins informed the district court there was a bankruptcy. The court
heard the case anyway and denied the temporary injunction. The Marro-
quins appealed the denial.
A temporary injunction will not be granted where there is an adequate
remedy at law. Here, the Marroquins could have informed the justice
court that there was a bankruptcy pending, thus invoking the automatic
stay.31 That would have been just as good a remedy as an injunction since
the automatic stay would have prohibited the issuance of an eviction or-
der. Since the bankruptcy stay afforded the same protection as an injunc-
tion, the Marroquins had an adequate remedy at law. It might have saved
everybody a good deal of time and effort if the bankruptcy had merely
been brought to the attention of the lender at the time of the detainer
action.
II. ARTICLE 9 SECURITY INTERESTS
In Friedman v. Atlantic Funding Corp.,32 Atlantic Funding obtained
Friedman's note from the Resolution Trust Corporation (RTC). The note
was secured by an Article 9 security interest in Friedman's car. After
default, the car was sold and a deficiency action brought by Atlantic.
Summary judgment was awarded to Atlantic and Friedman appealed. In
her appeal, Friedman alleged that Atlantic had failed to notify her of the
disposition of the car and that Atlantic had failed to show that it had
disposed of the collateral in a commercially reasonable manner.
A secured party has the burden of proving disposition of collateral in a
commercially reasonable manner. 33 A commercially reasonable disposi-
tion is a condition precedent to the secured party's right to seek a
deficiency. 34
29. See id.
30. 943 S.W.2d 112 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1997, no writ).
31. Title 11 of the Bankruptcy Code provides that once a petition is filed in bank-
ruptcy, an automatic stay is imposed, prohibiting the commencement or continuation of
any judicial actions or proceedings against the debtor. 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(1) (1994).
32. 936 S.W.2d 38 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1996, no writ).
33. See Greathouse v. Charter Nat'l Bank-Southwest, 851 S.W.2d 173, 176 (Tex. 1992).
34. See id. at 175-76.
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Atlantic argued that Greathouse applied only to the original parties to
the debt, not to a holder in due course, which it was because of its acquisi-
tion of the note from the RTC. Two earlier appellate court cases have
dealt with the issue of commercial reasonableness and holders in due
course and, as usually happens, came to different conclusions. In the first
of these cases, Roquemore v. National Commerce Bank,35 the court held
that holder in due course status had no effect on the secured party's obli-
gation to prove commercial reasonableness. 36 Commercial reasonable-
ness is not a defense, but is a condition precedent to the cause of action.
Holder in due course status shields the holder from certain defenses, but
does not diminish the holder's duties when bringing its basic claims. In
the second case, Burns v. RTC,37 the court held that the failure to give
notice to a debtor was a personal defense of the debtor, not available
against a holder in due course. 38 In Burns, the court failed to notice or
mention that Article 9's notice requirements are different obligations
from Article 9's commercial reasonableness requirements, 39 but since al-
most everyone else makes the same mistake, this fact is insignificant.
The San Antonio Court of Appeals agreed with the Roquemore case.
Greathouse established a firm rule that commercial reasonableness is a
condition precedent, not the basis of a defense. 40 Having not pled or
proven that the collateral was disposed of in a commercially reasonable
manner, Atlantic was not entitled to summary judgment.
III. USURY
A. USURY LEGISLATION
The most significant occurrences in Texas usury law this year were leg-
islative. House Bill 1971 was repealed and replaced the existing Texas
Credit Code41 with what is now referred to as the Texas Credit Title.42
House Bill 10 enacted a new Finance Code, which is basically a non-sub-
stantive revision of the Texas Credit Code and various other statutes re-
lating to financial institutions and transactions.
Among the substantive changes to the usury laws brought about by
House Bill 1971 are the following:43
First, several new definitions were added. Among these, are definitions
35. 837 S.W.2d 212 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1992, no writ).
36. See id. at 214.
37. 880 S.W.2d 149 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1994, no writ).
38. See id. at 154.
39. See Steven C. Haley, Sale or Disposition of Personal Property Collateral, 1995 AD-
VANCED REAL ESTATE LAW COURSE, STATE BAR OF TEXAS (1995).
40. See Friedman, 936 S.W.2d at 41.
41. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 5069 (Vernon 1987).
42. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 5069, (Vernon Supp. 1998).
43. This is a very abbreviated discussion of a very extensive piece of legislation. For a
more elaborate treatment of the subject, see David W. Tomek, Recent Statutory Changes to
Usury Laws, REAL ESTATE LAW: TRANSACTIONS-IN-DEPTH (1998).
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providing helpful distinctions between legal interest,44 contract interest,45
and judgment interest.46
Second, the method of calculating interest for usury purposes has been
changed. House Bill 1971 now requires all interest to be "aggregated and
amortized using the actuarial method" during the term of the loan.47 Un-
fortunately, there is no indication of any sort in this legislation what the
term "actuarial method" means.
Third, House Bill 1971 eliminated the possibility that a mere breach of
contract, by charging more than a contract permits, could be considered
usury, even if the charge is less than the maximum lawful rate.48 A credi-
tor who now charges more than his contract allows but less than the maxi-
mum rate is not subject to usury penalties. 49
Fourth, the penalty of forfeiture for "double usury" (i.e., where interest
is at more than twice the legal limit) has been changed. Forfeiture is now
available only to a creditor who charges and receives double usury, but
does not apply to a creditor who merely contracts for double usury.50
Fifth, special provisions were enacted for "qualified commercial loans."
A "commercial loan" is a "loan that is made primarily for business, com-
mercial, investment, agricultural, or similar purposes. '51 A "qualified
commercial loan" is one which is $3,000,000 or more in original principal
amount, or a renewal or extension of a loan originally of $3,000,000 or
more.52 In a commercial loan, the creditor and obligor may agree to
compute the term and rate on the basis of a 360-day year consisting of
twelve thirty-day months,53 may agree to a voluntary prepayment
charge,54 and may stipulate for a late charge of no more than five percent
of the delinquent installment beginning not less than ten days after the
due date, as well as a return check charge of twenty-five dollars. 55 In a
qualified commercial loan, the parties may contract for additional charges
yielding profits and equity participations to lenders, and such additional
charges are not considered interest.56
44. Interest charged or received in the absence of any agreement by an obligor to pay
contract interest, but excluding judgment interest. See TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art.
5069, § 1B.002(a)(8) (Vernon Supp. 1998).
45. "Interest that an obligor has paid or agreed to pay to a creditor under a written
contract." Id. § 1B.002(a)(1).
46. "Interest on a money judgment, whether the interest accrues before, on, or after
the date the judgment is rendered." Id. § 1B.002(a)(7).
47. Id. § 1C.001(c) (Vernon Supp. 1998).
48. See generally Hardwick v. Austin Gallery of Oriental Rugs, Inc., 779 S.W.2d 438
(Tex. App.-Austin 1989, writ denied), (raising the specter of "contractual usury" claims).
49. See TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 5069, § 1F.001(c) (Vernon Supp. 1998).
50. Id. §§ 1F.002, 1F.004.
51. Id. § 1H.001(5).
52. Id. § 1H.001(9).
53. See id. § 1H.003.
54. See id. § 1H.005.
55. See id. § 1H.006.




Parhms v. B&B Ventures, Inc.57 deals with late charges and usury sav-
ings clauses. Ventures entered into a contract for deed with Parhms. The
contract required monthly payments on the principal, plus interest.
There was a late payment provision requiring fifteen dollar per day late
charge. The contract contained a usury savings clause.58 Parhms was late
on almost every payment. For each late payment, Ventures made a late
payment charge and sent a default notice.
Parhms brought this action alleging that the late charges plus the inter-
est charged in the transaction were usurious. He further argued that the
usury savings clause did not cure the problem because such a clause is
ineffective where usurious interest is provided by contract.59
The essence of Parhms' claim was that the contract itself was usurious,
not that the separate charges were usurious. The court disagreed.60 The
collection of late charges was specifically contingent upon the payments
being late. A usury savings clause, while not effective where a contract is
usurious on its face, may be effective where the usury depends upon an
open-ended contingency that may or may not happen or that may or may
not result in excess interest. 61
First USA Management, Inc. v. Esmond62 deals with speculative, con-
tingent, or uncertain payments in the context of a usury claim. First USA
bought Esmond's business and simultaneously entered into an employ-
ment arrangement with him. Pursuant to the employment contract, if Es-
mond was terminated without cause during the term of the contract, First
USA was obligated to pay him the balance of the salary for the entire
57. 938 S.W.2d 199 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1997, writ denied).
58. The clause reads as follows:
Notwithstanding anything contained herein to the contrary, in no event shall
the aggregate of any interest charged hereby, plus any other amounts
charged or collected in connection hereby, plus any other amounts charged
or collected in connection herewith which are deemed "interest" under the
laws of the State of Texas and the United States of America in effect on the
date hereof permitting the charging and collecting of the highest non-usuri-
ous interest with respect hereto (hereinafter referred to as "Applicable
Law") ever exceed the maximum amount of interest which could be lawfully
charged with respect hereto under Applicable Law. If any amount of inter-
est taken or received by Seller shall be in excess of the maximum amount of
interest which, under Applicable Law, could lawfully have collected hereon,
then the excess shall be deemed to have been and [sic] result of a mathemati-
cal error by Seller and Purchaser, and shall be refunded promptly to Pur-
chaser. All amounts paid or agreed to be paid in connection herewith which
under Applicable Law would be deemed "interest" shall, to the extent per-
mitted by Applicable Law, be amortized, prorated, allocated and spread
throughout the term hereof.
Id. at 203.
59. See First State Bank v. Dorst, 843 S.W.2d 790, 792 (Tex. App.-Austin 1992, writ
denied).
60. See Parhms, 938 S.W.2d at 203.
61. See Smart v. Tower Land & Inv. Co., 597 S.W.2d 333, 340-41 (Tex.1980); First State
Bank v. Dorst, 843 S.W.2d 790, 792 (Tex. App.-Austin 1992, writ denied).
62. 960 S.W.2d 625 (Tex. 1997).
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term. Shortly after beginning work, Esmond asked for and received an
$18,000 loan from First USA. As a condition to the loan, Esmond agreed
that a default would be cause for termination. Of course, he defaulted.
When he was terminated for cause (in First USA's words), First USA did
not pay the balance of the contract salary, which amounted to $280,000.
Esmond claimed that the failure to pay him the $280,000 was the same as
an interest charge of $280,000 on the $18,000 loan.
The court of appeals held the charge was not usurious because it was
contingent and speculative. 63 It was contingent because of the circum-
stances that allowed the payment to be withheld or paid. It was specula-
tive because the calculation of the amount to be withheld or paid
depended on a number of factors.64
The Texas Supreme Court agreed, in a much less eloquent or reasoned
opinion. It held that, just as uncertainty in an obligation to repay princi-
pal casts doubt on whether the transaction is a loan, uncertainty in the
value of a contractual right given up by a party casts doubt on whether
that value is interest.65 Even if First USA benefitted financially from Es-
mond's termination, and if that value could be determined, and if it were
the same as the financial detriment to Esmond, the uncertainty in the
determination means that the benefit to First USA could not be consid-
ered interest.66
Esmond argued that there was no uncertainty because he was termi-
nated and was entitled to a specific amount. The Court threw into the
equation, however, the fact that in terminating Esmond, First USA was
losing something of some value.67 It is not true that an employer stands
to gain by terminating an employee. The loss of the employee's services
may exceed the debt. The uncertainty in that value was the driving force
in the holding that the withheld payments were not interest.68
IV. LENDER LIABILITY
Thornhill v. Ronnie's 1-45 Truck Stop, Inc. 69 could be a lender's worst
nightmare come true. Ronnie's Truck Stop burned down, killing Thorn-
hill and Ross. Glassel owned the truck stop. The truck stop was financed
by AICC, which held a mortgage on the truck stop property. For two
years before the fire, Glassel was in default under the loan from AICC.
During that period of time, AICC could have foreclosed at any time, but
did not. There were, during that time, a number of fire hazards noted by
63. First USA Mgmt., Inc. v. Esmond, 911 S.W.2d 100 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1995), rev'd,
960 S.W.2d 625 (Tex. 1997).
64. See id. (citing Beavers v. Taylor, 434 S.W.2d 230, 231 (Tex.Civ.App.-Waco 1968,
writ ref'd n.r.e.), and distinguishing Najarro v. SASI Int'l, Ltd., 904 F.2d 1002 (5th
Cir.1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1048 (1991)).




69. 944 S.W.2d 780 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 1997, writ dism'd).
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the fire department, but Glassel did nothing to remedy them. Glassel
testified that he had no hope of repaying the loan and had told AICC that
it could have the place back. AICC told Glassel that they wanted him to
stay on to operate the truck stop for them. According to Glassel, AICC
didn't want to foreclose because it didn't want to assume the liabilities of
ownership. Also according to Glassel, AICC was "calling the shots in the
operation and control of the motel," with Glassel getting instructions
from them on a daily basis.70 Glassel said that he had fully informed
AICC of the nature and extent of the fire hazards and had requested
additional funds from AICC to correct them. At the time of the fire, the
truck stop was in bankruptcy.
The estates of the deceased sued AICC, alleging that it was a possessor
of the truck stop whose negligence in failing to remedy the fire hazards
caused the deaths. AICC pointed to the pending bankruptcy and claimed
that Glassel was a debtor in possession and that AICC was nothing more
than a lender.
Under the Restatement (Second) of Torts, section 328E,71 a possessor is
a person (i) who is in occupation of the land with intent to control it; (ii) a
person who has been in occupation of the land with intent to control it, if
no other person has subsequently occupied it with the intent to control it;
or (iii) a person who is entitled to immediate occupation of the land, if no
other person is in possession under clauses (i) and (ii). Texas courts have
held that a possessor is the party in control of the premises, 72 which "is
defined as the power or authority to manage, direct, superintend, restrict,
regulate, govern, administer, or oversee. '73 The court held there was suf-
ficient evidence to hold AICC liable as a possessor.74
AICC made several arguments that it was not a possessor. First, it ar-
gued that a party cannot be a possessor unless it controls the access of
third parties. The court said that ability to control access may be evi-
dence of control, but is not dispositive. 75 Second, AICC argued that a
party cannot be a possessor without physically occupying the premises.
The court said that physical occupancy is not part of the test.76 Third,
AICC argued that the pending bankruptcy action prevented it from being
a possessor. The court held, however, that it was the exercise of control
which made it a possessor, not the question of rightful possession.77 Even
though the bankruptcy may have made the possession wrongful, it still
existed And even though it did not have title to the premises, it was still
70. Id. at 784.
71. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 328E (1965).
72. See Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Alexander, 868 S.W.2d 322, 324 (Tex. 1993); Howe v.
Kroger Co., 598 S.W.2d 929, 930 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1980, no writ).
73. Gunn v. Harris Methodist Affiliated Hosp., 887 S.W.2d 248, 252 (Tex. App.-Fort
Worth 1994, writ denied).
74. See Thornhill, 944 S.W.2d at 792.
75. See id. at 790 (citing Prestwood v. Taylor, 728 S.W.2d 455, 461 (Tex. App.-Austin
1987, writ ref'd n.r.e.)).
76. See id. (citing Gunn, 887 S.W.2d at 251).
77. See id. (citing Alexander, 868 S.W.2d at 324).
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the exercise of control, not the ownership of title, that made AICC a
possessor.78 Finally, AICC argued, on policy grounds, that creating a new
lender liability cause of action for lender's who had not foreclosed when
they had the opportunity would shock the Texas financial community and
negatively affect the decisions of lenders loaning money in Texas. The
court didn't buy the policy argument. It said:
AICC is not liable because it was a lender that failed to foreclose on
its secured property, but is liable because of the control it exercised
over the motel premises with full knowledge of the multitude of fire
code violations that existed at the motel. In most situations, a lender
does not exercise the kind of control that AICC did over its secured
property until after foreclosure. It is only in the rare instance where
the lender exercises a high degree of control over the premises prior
to the foreclosure, that a lender will be found to be a possessor under
Section 328E of the Restatement (Second) of Torts. A judgment on
the jury's verdict will not expand or create any new liability on the
part of lenders that did not previously exist under Section 328E.
79
The court also noted that, under the loan documents, AICC had the
power to order corrections of fire hazards even in the absence of
foreclosure.80
V. DTPA
Once again, a disgruntled borrower attempted to bring a DTPA claim
against a lender, and once again, the borrower failed. This time it was in
Brown v. Bank of Galveston, N.A. 81 Brown was having a house built. He
got into a dispute with the builder just before the house was finished. As
a result of the dispute, Brown's permanent financing fell through and the
Bank ended up foreclosing on its construction loan. Ultimately, when
Brown did not get the house, he sued the Bank, alleging DTPA
violations.
The court held that Brown was not a consumer as to the Bank.82 In
order to be a consumer, a party must have sought or acquired goods or
services from someone,83 and those goods or services must form the basis
of the DTPA complaint. 84 If either of those elements is not proved, the
complainant is not a consumer.85 A person who seeks only to borrow
money is not a consumer under the DTPA because money is not a good
or a service.86 However, where the extension of credit is incident to the
78. See id.
79. See id. at 791.
80. See id.
81. 930 S.W.2d 140 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1996), aff'd 41 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 437,
1998 WL 59032 (Feb. 13, 1998).
82. See id. at 144.
83. See TEX. Bus. & CoM. CODE ANN. § 17.45(4) (Vernon 1987); Central Tex. Hard-
ware, Inc. v. First City, Texas-Bryan, N.A., 810 S.W.2d 234, 236-37 (Tex. App.-Houston
[14th Dist.] 1991, writ denied).
84. See Melody Home Mfg. Co. v. Barnes, 741 S.W.2d 349, 351-52 (Tex. 1987).
85. See Cameron v. Terrell & Garrett, Inc., 618 S.W.2d 535, 539 (Tex. 1981).
86. See Riverside Nat'l Bank v. Lewis, 603 S.W.2d 169, 174-75 (Tex. 1980).
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sale of goods or services and the conduct of the party extending the credit
is intertwined in the transaction, the borrower may be a consumer with
respect to the creditor, as well as to the seller, of the goods. 87 A creditor
may be inextricably intertwined in the transaction so as to confer con-
sumer status on a party if the extension of credit forms the means of
making the sale or purchase from the buyer's perspective.88 Therefore, to
hold a creditor liable in a consumer credit transaction, the creditor must
be shown to have some connection either with the actual sales transaction
or with a deceptive act related to financing the transaction. Here, Brown
never sought anything from the Bank. Further, he did not argue that the
Bank was inextricably intertwined with the builder. His claim was that
when the Bank foreclosed on its liens, it had stepped into the builder's
shoes and thus, for all intents and purposes, became the contractor, and
wrongfully foreclosed on the contractor's lien it had acquired. Brown did
not base his consumer status on the relationship of the Bank and the
builder to the sales transaction, but a wrongful act unrelated to the fi-
nancing of the transaction. This was not enough.
In Hartman v. Urban,89 Urban prepared a plat of a subdivision on Pa-
dre Island in 1972. The plat was incorrect in its description of Lot 31.
The plat showed 53.12 feet of waterfront, when the correct footage was
41.24 feet. Upon discovering the error-at some point in 1974-Urban
prepared a revised plat and delivered it to the developer; however, the
developer failed to record the revision.
Hartman purchased Lot 31 in 1993 and, in the process of trying to con-
figure his dream house on the lot, discovered the error which would have
been disclosed had the revised plat been recorded. He sued Urban for
DTPA violations based upon alleged misrepresentations shown on the
original plat. Hartman alleged that the representations made in the in-
correct plat constituted negligence and violated the DTPA.
As to the negligence claim, the issue was whether Urban owed a duty
of reasonable care in the preparation of a plat to a purchaser of a lot who
relied upon the plat.
A subdivision of land is done by the owner under the Texas Local Gov-
ernment Code.90 In preparing the plat, the owner necessarily relies upon
various professionals to aid in accomplishing the task. The owner has
control over the professionals and the platting process. Thus, the plat is
the product of the owner, not the engineer or surveyor who prepares the
plat. Thus, Urban could have liability to Hartman only if there were a
duty of care owed to third parties. The court held that the duty of care to
third parties is the same for Urban as an engineer, as it would be for
87. See Qantel Bus. Sys., Inc. v. Custom Controls Co., 761 S.W.2d 302, 305 (Tex.
1988); Security Bank v. Dalton, 803 S.W.2d 443, 452 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1991, writ
denied).
88. See Flenniken v. Longview Bank and Trust Co., 661 S.W.2d 705, 707 (Tex. 1983).
89. 946 S.W.2d 546 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1997, n.w.h.).
90. TEX. Loc. GOV'T CODE §§ 212.004, 232.001 (Vernon 1988).
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attorneys and physicians,91 and moreover, there was a "privity barrier"
that protected Urban from the claims of third parties.92
As to the DTPA claims, the court held that they were time-barred. 93
The plat, having been filed in 1972, predated the DTPA, thus the DTPA
was not available. 94 Hartman argued that the existence of the incorrect
plat on file was a continuing misrepresentation. The court disagreed,
stating:
The presence of Urban's plat at the county clerk's office constituted
neither an "act" nor a "practice." A true "continuing misrepresen-
tation" for purposes of the DTPA involves actual, active assurances
and reassurances of something by the party sued. The substantive
rights and duties of a party pursuant to an agreement are those
under the law as it existed at the time the agreement was made. A
subsequent law that changes those rights and duties would violate
the Texas Constitution's prohibition against ex post facto laws. In
the present case, Urban's representation of the size of the lot was
made prior to the effective date of the DTPA. The subsequent enac-
tion of the DTPA could not make that prior misrepresentation ac-
tionable, despite the fact that the plat remained recorded and
uncorrected at the county clerk's office.95
Hartman also argued that the preparation of the revised plat and the
failure to record it constituted another misrepresentation. The court,
without elaboration, said it was not.96
VI. LEASES
Austin Hill Country Realty, Inc. v. Palisades Plaza, Inc.97 is undoubt-
edly the most significant real property case of 1997, and may be one of
the most significant in a decade or more. In a unanimous decision, with
the opinion written by Justice Rose Spector, the Texas Supreme Court
announced that "a landlord has a duty to make reasonable efforts to miti-
gate damages. '98
Palisades owned and operated an office complex consisting of four of-
fice buildings in Austin. Palisades and Hill Country executed a five-year
commercial office lease for a suite in the Palisades' office complex. The
lease was to begin on the "commencement date," which was defined in
the lease and the improvements agreement as either (1) the date that Hill
Country occupied the suite, or (2) the date that the Palisades substan-
91. See Hartman, 946 S.W.2d at 550 (citing Barcelo v. Elliott, 923 S.W.2d 575
(Tex.1996); Krishnan v. Sepulveda, 916 S.W.2d 478 (Tex. 1995)).
92. See id.
93. See id.
94. Section 17.63 of the DTPA provides, in relevant part, that the "provisions of this
subchapter apply only to acts or practices occurring after the effective date of this sub-
chapter." TEX. Bus. & CoM. CODE ANN. § 17.63 (Vernon 1987). The effective date of the
DTPA was May 21, 1973. See id.
95. Hartman, 946 S.W.2d at 551 (citations omitted).
96. See id. at 551.
97. 948 S.W.2d 293 (Tex. 1997).
98. Id. at 294.
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tially completed the improvements or would have done so but for "tenant
delay." They anticipated the lease would begin on November 15, 1992.
After construction disputes arose, Palisades demanded that Hill Coun-
try appoint a representative to help solve them. When Hill Country
failed to do so, Palisades informed it and its principals that the failure to
designate a representative was an anticipatory breach of contract. The
parties tried unsuccessfully to resolve their differences in a meeting. Pali-
sades then sued Hill Country for anticipatory breach of the lease.
At trial, Hill Country argued that Palisades failed to mitigate the dam-
ages resulting from Hill Country's alleged breach. Hill Country re-
quested an instruction asking the jury to reduce the Palisades' damage
award by "any amount that you find [Palisades] could have avoided by
the exercise of reasonable care." 99 The trial judge rejected this instruc-
tion, stating, "[liast time I checked the law, it was that a landlord doesn't
have any obligation to try to fill the space."' 100 The jury returned a ver-
dict for Palisades and the court of appeals affirmed that judgment.101
The traditional common law rule is that landlords have no duty to miti-
gate.' 02 This rule stems from the concept that a lease is an .estate in real
property, owned by the tenant during the term of the lease. As long as
the tenant has the right to possess the estate, the tenant has the obligation
to pay the rent. The landlord has no duty to mitigate, should the tenant
abandon the premises.10 3 Texas has consistently followed this rule. 0 4
The Texas Supreme Court noted that forty-two states now have im-
posed an obligation to mitigate on the landlord. 10 5 Only six states have
explicitly held otherwise.' 0 6 Those requiring mitigation have recognized
that leases have changed from their nature as primarily real property to
their current status as commercial contracts. Recognizing leases as pri-
marily commercial contracts allows the court to impose the same rules to
leases that otherwise apply to commercial contracts. Further, mitigation
discourages economic waste and encourages productive use of the prop-
erty. Thus, the Court held that, "a landlord has a duty to make reason-
able efforts to mitigate damages when the tenant breaches the lease and
abandons the property, unless the commercial landlord and tenant con-
99. Id. at 295.
100. Id.
101. See Austin Hill Country Realty, Inc. v. Palisades Plaza, Inc., 938 S.W.2d 469 (Tex.
App-Austin 1995), rev'd 948 S.W.2d 293 (Tex. 1997).
102. See Dawn R. Barker, Note, Commercial Landlords' Duty upon Tenants' Abandon-
ment-To Mitigate?, 20 J. CORP. L. 627, 629 (1995).
103. See Reid v. Mut. of Omaha Ins. Co., 776 P.2d 896, 902, 905 (Utah 1989); Gruman v.
Investors Diversified Servs., 78 N.W.2d 377, 379-80 (Minn. 1956).
104. See, e.g., Metroplex Glass Ctr., Inc. v. Vantage Properties, Inc., 646 S.W.2d 263,
265 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1983, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Apex Co. v. Grant, 276 S.W. 445, 447 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Dallas 1925, writ ref'd). See generally E.L. Kellett, Annotation, Landlord's
Duty, On Tenant's Failure to Occupy, or Abandonment of, Premises, to Mitigate Damages
by Accepting or Procuring Another Tenant, 21 A.L.R.3d 534, 555-56 (1968).
105. See Austin Hill Country, 948 S.W.2d at 296-7 n.1 (citing various foreign state law).




The Court then considered the practical application of the duty to miti-
gate. The level of responsibility of the landlord, requires him to use ob-
jectively reasonable efforts to fill the premises when the tenant vacates in
breach of the lease.10 8 This is not an absolute duty, and it does not give
the tenant a cause of action against the landlord for failure to mitigate.109
Failure to use reasonable efforts to mitigate merely bars recovery of dam-
ages to the extent that damages reasonably could have been avoided. 110
In addition, the tenant bears the burden of proving failure to mitigate. 1
Finally, the Court considered the situations in which the duty actually
exists. In Texas, a landlord has typically had four causes of action on
breach of a lease.112 First, the landlord could maintain the lease and sue
for rents."l 3 Second, the landlord can treat the breach as an anticipatory
breach, repossess and sue for the present value of rentals reduced by the
reasonable market value of the property for the remainder of the term.
114
Third, the landlord could treat the breach as an anticipatory breach, re-
possess, relet the property, and sue the tenant for the difference between
the contractual rent and the amount received from the new tenant.'1 5
Fourth, the landlord could treat the breach as a forfeiture of the lease and
relieve the tenant of its future obligation to pay rents. 1
16
The Court said the landlord must have a duty to mitigate when it treats
the lease as an anticipatory repudiation because that is basically a con-
tractual action."l 7 The Court then tackled the troubling problem of treat-
ing the lease as still in effect and suing for rents. To require the landlord
to mitigate in that instance would force the landlord to re-enter the prem-
ises and thereby risk terminating the lease or accepting the tenant's sur-
render. The Court held, in those situations, that "mitigation is required
only if (1) the landlord actually reenters, or (2) the lease allows the land-
lord to reenter the premises without accepting surrender, forfeiting the
lease, or being construed as evicting the tenant."" a8 This is an extremely
unfortunate case, because it is very clear that the Texas Supreme Court
has changed centuries-old law with very little understanding of the law it
has changed.
First, the Court made its decision in a case of anticipatory repudiation,
where the landlord is suing for damages, rather than in a case involving a





112. There is an excellent discussion of these duties, as well as an excellent analysis of
this case by Robert Harms Bliss, Mitigation of Landlord's Damages: Making Sense of Aus-
tin Hill Country Realty, REAL ESTATE LAW: LEASES IN DEPTH (1998)








suit for rents. The measure of damages for anticipatory repudiation has
always included a sort of "built-in" mitigation factor. That measure is the
difference between the current value of the rents due under the lease
reduced by the fair market value of the premises for the remainder of the
term.119 The rule that there has been no duty to mitigate arose out of
cases where the landlord sued for rents, in other words, maintained the
lease estate and the contract in effect for the remainder of the term.1 20
Thus, it appears that the Texas Supreme Court has imposed a completely
unnecessary, and somewhat unfair, duty of mitigation upon a situation
where a landlord, in seeking damages, has already submitted to mitiga-
tion. Unfortunately, this misunderstanding of leasehold remedies has al-
ready found its way into the lower courts. In Cash America International
v. Hampton Place, Inc.,121 the Fort Worth Court of Appeals held that the
already mitigated damages of a landlord who sought recovery for antici-
patory repudiation of a lease must again be mitigated by whatever
amounts could have been avoided had the landlord used reasonable care
to relet the premises.
The mitigation instruction sanctioned by the Texas Supreme Court
asks the jury to reduce damages by not only the reasonable cash
market value for the unexpired term, but also by the amount of dam-
ages, if any, that could have been avoided had the landlord used
"reasonable care" in reletting the premises. This additional instruc-
tion permits the jury to weigh evidence of the amount of money, if
any, lost by the landlord's failure to exercise reasonable care in
maintaining and managing the property, which would reduce the
cash market value of the lease and thus reduce the damages owed
the landlord.122
The Texas Supreme Court, despite its holding that mitigation in suits
for rent was required only when the landlord re-enters the premises or
the lease permits such re-entry, created an almost frivolous addition to its
holding, since virtually every commercial lease includes a right of re-
entry. 123
In addition, the Court added a right to contract around the mitigation
duty that has subsequently been eliminated by the Legislature. The
Court held that the duty to mitigate exists, "unless the commercial land-
lord and tenant contract otherwise. ' 124 New legislation, however, pro-
vides that a landlord has a duty to mitigate damages if a tenant abandons
the leased premises in violation of the lease, and further states that a
provision in a lease that "purports to waive a right or to exempt a land-
119. See John Church Co. v. Martinez, 204 S.W.2d 486 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1918,
writ ref'd); White v. Watkins, 385 S.W.2d 267 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1964, no writ).
120. See Everett S. Stovall, Remedies of the Landlord When Tenant Fails to Pay Rent, 13
BAYLOR L. REV. 374 (1961).
121. 955 S.W.2d 459 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1997, pet. denied).
122. Id. at 463.
123. See Bliss, supra note 112, at 14.
124. Austin Hill Country, 948 S.W.2d at 299.
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lord or duty under this section is void."' 125
In one other lease case of note, Regency Advantage Limited Partner-
ship v. Bingo Idea-Watauga, Inc.,l26 Bingo leased space from Texas
American Bank. The lease provided that Bingo had sixty days to obtain
the necessary permits to operate its bingo parlor. If Bingo obtained the
permits within that period, the Bank would finish out the space within the
next forty-five days. After receiving two temporary permits, Bingo's per-
manent permit was denied. The space was never built out and never oc-
cupied. The building was eventually sold to Regency. As part of the
conveyance, Regency assumed all of the obligations under the leases on
the building from and after the date it acquired the property.
Regency filed a declaratory judgment action, seeking a determination
that the lease had expired because of non-payment of rent. Bingo coun-
terclaimed that Regency had failed to finish out the space.
The Court held that, even if the Bank had breached the lease for fail-
ure to build out the space, Regency had not breached the lease because
the build-out obligation accrued before Regency acquired the property.
The duty to build out the leased premises was a one-time obligation, ac-
cruing forty-five days after receipt of the bingo approvals.
The determination, however, that the Bank, rather than Regency, had
breached the lease, did not mean Bingo had no rights against Regency.
When the original lessor breaches the lease prior to transferring it to a
subsequent lessor, the other party to the lease may be entitled to termi-
nate the lease for the past breaches. 127
VII. DEEDS AND CONVEYANCES
Eversole v. Williams,128 deals with construction of a deed conveying a
life estate and remainder estates. Sophie was given a deed by her parents
in 1933. It provided that Sophie would receive all of the income and have
full control over the land during her lifetime. The deed further provided
that the property would, on Sophie's death, pass to and vest in her chil-
dren. At the time of the deed, Sophie had three children. Two of the
children predeceased her, leaving heirs of their own. The sole surviving
child brought an action to construe the deed. He argued that the deed
vested title in only those children who were alive at the time of the life-
tenant's death.
The court held that a remainder is vested where there is a person in
being who would have an immediate right to possession on the termina-
tion of the immediate estate.'2 9 The law favors the vesting of estates at
the earliest possible period. Under general rules, remainders to children
125. See Act of June 20, 1997, 75th Leg., R.S., ch 1205, § 8, 1997 Tex. Sess. Law Serv.
4627, 4629 (Vernon) (codified at TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 91.006 (Vernon Supp. 1998)).
126. 936 S.W.2d 275 (Tex. 1997).
127. See id. at 278.
128. 943 S.W.2d 141 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1997, no writ).
129. See id. at 144.
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of life tenants vest at the time of the conveyance, subject only to opening
to allow for the equal interest of children born later. The court stated
that the deed does not make survival of their mother a condition prece-
dent to the vesting of the remainder in Sophie's children. 130 The death of
the life tenant is mentioned in the deed not as the date when the remain-
der interests vest, but as the date to which the remainderman's right of
possession is postponed.
VIII. EASEMENTS
In Oak Hills Properties v. Saga Restaurants, Inc.,131 Oak Hills entered
into an easement agreement with Saga which provided Saga with a park-
ing easement on Oak Hills' property for Saga's customers so long as the
Saga property was being used for "restaurant and ancillary purposes.' 132
After complaints from Oak Hills' tenants that Saga was using up the
parking, Oak Hills sued Saga, alleging that Saga's use of its property was
not a restaurant use.
Saga operated a dive called the "Piranha Room," which specialized pri-
marily in dispensing beverages. Nothing in the easement agreement de-
fined the term "restaurant," so Oak Hills tried to impose the San Antonio
City Code definition of restaurant, as a place which earns more than half
its revenues from food sales rather than from alcohol.133 The Piranha
Room apparently obtained most of its revenues from alcohol sales rather
than from food sales, so this was a convenient and helpful argument for
Oak Hills. However, the court saw no reason to use that definition as
nothing in the easement document that indicated that intention by the
parties.134 Therefore, the court applied the general rule that the words
and phrases used by the litigants in their agreement will be given their
ordinary and commonly accepted meaning. 135
IX. RESTRICTIONS
Simon Property Group (Texas), L.P. v. May Department Stores Co.136
is an interesting and informative case involving several inconsistent sets
of restrictive covenants covering a shopping center. The dispute centered
around Foley's expansion and opening of a store at La Plaza Mall in
McAllen.
The major part of the dispute involved restrictions in one REA which
seemed to allow Foley's to construct its expansion and restrictions in an-
other which seemed to prohibit the expansion. A supplement which tied
130. See id. at 143.
131. 940 S.W.2d 243 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1997, no writ).
132. Id. at 244.
133. See id. at 245.
134. See id.
135. See id. (citing Mullins v. Elieson, 611 S.W.2d 921, 925 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo
1981, no writ)).
136. 943 S.W.2d 64 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1997, no writ).
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the two REAs together made them "concurrent" and "coordinate."' 137
The court held that the restrictions were of equal parity, but went on to
state that it remained at a loss to determine the parties' intended rights
under the REAs.13s
Upon concluding that it could not determine what the parties intended,
the court turned to the basic Texas law regarding restrictive covenants.
Covenants restricting the free use of land are not favored by the courts,
but when they are confined to a lawful purpose and are clearly worded,
they will be enforced. 139 Doubts are to be resolved in favor of free and
unrestricted use of premises.140 Restrictions giving rise to ambiguity or
substantial doubt as to interpretation should be resolved in a manner that
favors "free use of land."'1 41 Thus, the court resolved the doubts about
Foley's rights to expand in favor of Foley's.
In Herbert v. Polly Ranch Homeowners Association,142 restrictive cove-
nants provided that single family houses could only be built on certain
lots. The restrictions also specified minimum building sizes, side yards
and front clearance lines. None of the restrictions prohibited subdividing
of lots. Some of the homeowners sought to subdivide lots into two and
build single family houses on each of the subdivided lots. The houses
would comply with the minimum standards set out in the restrictions.
The court held that the restrictions permitted the subdivision of lots
and the construction of single family houses thereon, as long as they com-
plied with the other provisions of the restrictions. 143 There was plenty of
testimony at the trial about the framer's intentions, however, because the
restrictions were not ambiguous, the testimony was inadmissible.1 44
X. HOMESTEADS
It is old news by now, but as a result of the November 4, 1997, election,
the homestead provisions of the Texas Constitution 145 were amended to
permit so-called "home equity" lending. Until this amendment, volun-
tary liens on homesteads were prohibited except for purchase money,
taxes, and improvements. With the amendment to the Constitution, a
valid lien can be placed on a homestead for an extension of credit if
various strict requirements are met, including the following:
(1) the lien is voluntary and created under a written agreement
signed by both spouses;
137, See id. at 70.
138. See id. at 71.
139. See id. (citing Wilmoth v. Wilcox, 734 S.W.2d 656, 657 (Tex. 1987)).
140. See id.
141. See id. (citing Baker v. Brackeen, 354 S.W.2d 660, 663 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo
1962, no writ)).
142. 943 S.W.2d 906 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1996, no writ).
143. See id. at 908-09.
144. See id. at 913.
145. TEX. CoNST., art. XVI, § 50.
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(2) the lien does not, when added to all other valid liens on the
property, exceed eighty percent of the fair market value of the home-
stead on the date made;
(3) the lien does not provide for personal recourse liability for
the owner or the spouse;
(4) the lien may be foreclosed only by court order.
(5) the debt may be prepaid without penalty;
(6) the loan is made by a bank or savings and loan and is not
secured by any additional real or personal property or by an agricul-
tural homestead; and
(7) the loan may not be accelerated because of a decrease in the
value of the homestead or because of the owner's default under
other indebtedness.' 46
XI. BROKERS
The Texas Supreme Court has given us two good and interesting cases
regarding real estate brokers. In the first of these, Texas Builders v. Kel-
ler,147 Texas Builders leased some building space in El Paso to Atari.
When Atari wanted to get out of its lease, it hired Keller to find a subten-
ant for the space and to negotiate with Texas Builders for a buyout.
Within the same general time frame, Texas Builders sent out a solicitation
letter to area brokers, including Keller, offering unidentified space in the
same building and stating that it would pay a six percent lease
commission.
Keller showed the Atari space to Quickie, and got an offer, which Atari
rejected. Atari suggested that Keller put Quickie directly in touch with
Texas Builders. After the introduction, Texas Builders and Quickie did
not deal with Keller again, and signed a lease without his involvement.
Keller found out and demanded his six percent commission. When Texas
Builders refused, Keller sued for breach of contract, fraud, and civil con-
spiracy. The trial court found in Keller's favor and awarded damages.
The court of appeals affirmed, 148 holding that the solicitation letter was
sufficient evidence of an agreement to pay a commission.
To comply with the statute of frauds under the Real Estate License
Act, 49 the writing must identify the property in question. The writing is
sufficient only if it furnishes, within itself or by reference to another ex-
isting writing, the means or data by which the property in question can be
identified with reasonable certainty. 150 This writing did not do that. It
mentioned only the number of square feet in a larger building. A con-
tract providing for the sale or lease of an unidentifiable portion of a
146. See id. § 50(a)(6).
147. 928 S.W.2d 479 (Tex. 1996).
148. Warner Comm., Inc. v. Keller, 888 S.W.2d 586 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1994),
affd in part, rev'd in part 928 S.W.2d 479 (Tex. 1996).
149. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 6573a, § 20(b) (Vernon 1969).
150. Owen v. Hendricks, 433 S.W.2d 164, 166 (Tex. 1968).
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larger identifiable tract is not sufficient. 151
Perhaps a more significant case regarding brokerage commissions is
Trammel Crow Co. No. 60 v. Harkinson.152 Harkinson entered into an
exclusive agency agreement with Hunt to negotiate a lease. He found
some property owned by Crow and put the parties in touch. Crow, ac-
cording to Harkinson, promised to sign a commission agreement, and, in
reliance on that promise, Harkinson kept working, even though no agree-
ment was ever signed. When Crow and Hunt signed the lease, Crow of-
fered Harkinson about ten percent of what he was expecting in the way of
a commission. Harkinson sued for tortious interference with contract and
prospective business relationships, conspiracy, breach an oral commission
agreement, and fraud. In reversing summary judgment in favor of Crow,
the court of appeals 5 3 said there was nothing in the Real Estate License
Act's requirement of a writing that would bar the tortious interference
claim, even in the absence of a written commission agreement. The
Texas Supreme Court reversed.
Section 20(b) of the Texas Real Estate License Act 154 provides that a
broker cannot recover a real estate commission unless the agreement is in
writing. The Court noted that there never was a written agreement and
that the tortious interference claims appeared to be nothing more than a
disguised way of suing for the contract damages that Harkinson would
not have been entitled to.' 55 Unless there is some other law that gets you
around the requirement for a writing, you can not simply rephrase your
complaint as a tortious interference claim and accomplish indirectly what
you could not accomplish directly. 156
Harkinson brought up an old Texas Supreme Court case that seemed to
validate his claim, but the Court rejected it. In Clements v. Withers,157 the
Texas Supreme Court upheld a tortious interference claim in a case in-
volving a broker whose brokerage agreement was defective. There was a
written brokerage commission agreement, but the property description
was inadequate, rendering the agreement unenforceable. Still, the Court
allowed the interference claim. Here, the Court distinguished that case
by saying there is a world of difference between allowing such a claim
151. See Morrow v. E.F. Shotwell, 477 S.W.2d 538, 540 (Tex. 1972) ("north acreage...
out of the 145.8 acre tract of the Jefferson McGrew Survey No. 245"); Matney v. Odom,
147 Tex. 26, 210 S.W.2d 980, 982 (1948) ("four (4) acres out of the East end of a ten-acre
block on the P. Chireno Survey."); Greer v. Greer, 144 Tex. 528, 191 S.W.2d 848, 850
(1946) ("70 acres of land, more or less, out of the A.N. McKnight Survey, Patent No. 736,
Volume 3, Abstract No. 400"); Smith v. Sorelle, 126 Tex. 353, 87 S.W.2d 703, 703-04 (1935)
("100 acres out of blocks 8 and 9 of the subdivision of Jose Maria Pineda Survey... Pat.
608, Vol. 2"); Pfeiffer v. Lindsay, 123 S.W. 264, 265 (1886) ("50 acres of land out of the
J.M. Moss Survey, situated in Montague county, Texas, abstract No. 462").
152. 944 S.W.2d 631 (Tex. 1997).
153. Harkinson v. Trammel Crow Co. No. 60, 915 S.W.2d 28 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1995),
rev'd, 944 S.W.2d 631 (Tex. 1997).
154. TEX. REv. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 6573a, § 20(b) (Vernon Supp. 1998).
155. See Harkinson, 944 S.W.2d at 634.
156. See id.
157. 437 S.W.2d 818 (Tex. 1969).
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where there is merely a "technical" deficiency in an actual written agree-
ment, and allowing one where there is no agreement at all. 158
XII. TITLE INSURANCE
Stewart Title Guaranty Co. v. Aiello,159 deals with the duty of good faith
and fair dealing in the title insurance context. The Aiellos discovered that
their house was encroaching on a utility easement. Their title policy, is-
sued by Stewart, failed to show this defect. Nevertheless, Stewart refused
to pay the Aiellos' claim for the diminished value of their land. The Aiel-
los sued Stewart and, on the first day of trial, settled the lawsuit. An
agreed judgment was entered whereby Stewart would agree to buy the
Aiellos' house.
After the judgment was entered, Stewart's attorney ignored repeated
letters and telephone calls from the Aiellos' attorney attempting to com-
plete the settlement transaction. It was not until two months later, when
the Aiellos sent the constable to Stewart's offices with a writ of execution
that Stewart delivered a proposed deed for the Aiellos to sign. Stewart
paid most of the money it owed under the judgment to the Aiellos, but
did not send delay damages or post-judgment interest. The Aiellos deliv-
ered the deed anyway, but then sued Stewart for various violations of the
insurance code, the DTPA, and breaches of the duty of good faith and
fair dealing, all having to do with Stewart's post judgment behavior.
Stewart argued that it was not liable for breach of the duty of good
faith and fair dealing after the entry of the original judgment. The duty
arises out of an inequity in the relative bargaining positions between the
big old insurance company and the poor little consumer. Having a judg-
ment in hand, according to Stewart, gave the poor little consumer all the
protection it needed. The Aiellos, on the other hand, argued that the
duty continues after judgment is entered where the insurer must still per-
form certain acts in its capacity as insurer. The duty of good faith and fair
dealing in this post-judgment context is akin to the duties an insurer has
under the Insurance Code to avoid unfair settlement claims practices.
Section 21.21 of the Insurance Code 160 prohibits unfair settlement claims
practices, which it defines as "failing to attempt in good faith to effectuate
prompt, fair, and equitable settlement of a claim with respect to which
the insurer's liability has become reasonably clear." The court of appeals
agreed with the Aiellos, finding section 21.21 to be a codification of the
duty of good faith and fair dealing. 161 It was irrelevant that the judgment
was not an insurance policy. The question is whether the insurer engaged
in conduct prohibited by the act and by the duty. It was clear that Stew-
art had done so. Entry of the judgment did not relieve Stewart of the
158. See Harkinson, 944 S.W.2d at 635.
159. 941 S.W.2d 68 (Tex. 1997).
160. TEx. INS. CODE ANN., art. 21.21, § 4(10)(ii) (Vernon Supp. 1998).
161. Stewart Title Guar. Co. v. Aiello, 911 S.W.2d 463, 470 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1995),
rev'd, 941 S.W.2d 68 (Tex. 1997).
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responsibilities imposed by its special relationship with its insureds.
Where a special relationship was the basis of the underlying controversy
between the parties, and particularly where an agreed judgment affirma-
tively requires the performance of further acts by the breaching party in
fulfillment of its duties imposed by the special relationship, the duty of
good faith and fair dealing continues until those acts are complete. 162
The Supreme Court reversed. Ordinarily, a suit on an agreed judgment
is a contract suit, not a tort action.163 A party to a contract is free to
pursue its own interests, even if it breaches the contract, without incur-
ring tort liability. Unless an independent tort can be proved, such as
fraud, the judgment creditor must rely on a breach of contract action for
relief.a64
The duty of good faith and fair dealing in the insurance context arises
because of the disparity in bargaining power between the parties. 65 Af-
ter judgment is rendered, however, that disparity ceases. 166 The Aiellos
were not left vulnerable by Stewart's exclusive control of the situation.
Rather, as judgment creditors, they had a range of alternatives by which
to collect what they were owed.
Considerable doubt has been cast upon the validity of the standard ar-
bitration clause contained in Texas title insurance policies by the case,
Stewart Title Guaranty Co. v. Mack.' 67 In 1992 Mack bought some prop-
erty and obtained a title insurance policy in the amount of $160,000.
Troubles arose with title to the property, so Mack sought coverage under
his policy but was denied by Stewart. Mack sued Stewart, at which time
Stewart sought arbitration pursuant to the arbitration provision that is
part of the policy.' 68 Mack refused. The trial court refused to compel
arbitration, so Stewart appealed. The court of appeals held that it had no
jurisdiction for such an appeal, finding that neither the Texas General
162. See id.
163. See Wagner v. Warnasch, 156 Tex. 334, 295 S.W.2d 890, 893 (1956).
164. See Crim Truck & Tractor Co. v. Navistar Int'l Transp. Corp., 823 S.W.2d 591, 597
(Tex. 1992).
165. See Aiello, 941 S.W.2d at 71.
166. See id.
167. 945 S.W.2d 330 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1997, writ dism'd).
168. Since 1993, every owner's title insurance policy issued in the State of Texas must
contain the following provision requiring arbitration:
Unless prohibited by applicable law or unless this arbitration section is de-
leted by specific provision in Schedule B of this policy, either the Company
or the Insured may demand arbitration pursuant to the Title Insurance Arbi-
tration Rules of the American Arbitration Association. Arbitrable matters
include, but are not limited to, any controversy or claim between the Com-
pany and the Insured arising out of or relating to this Policy, and service of
the Company in connection with its issuance or the breach of a policy provi-
sion or other obligation. All arbitrable matters when the Amount of Insur-
ance is $1,000,000 or less SHALL BE arbitrated at the request of either the
Company or the Insured, unless the Insured is an individual person. ...
STATE BOARD OF INSURANCE, BASIC MANUAL OF RULES, RATES AND FORMS FOR THE




Arbitration Act,169 nor the Federal Arbitration Act, 170 applied. An ap-
peal is allowed under the Texas Act only if the Act applies.171
The Texas Act excludes certain contracts from binding arbitration.
Among those are contracts for the acquisition by an individual person of
real or personal property, as well as services, where the total considera-
tion to be paid or furnished by the individual is less than $50,000, unless
the individual and the other party both agree in writing to binding arbi-
tration. 172 Mack claimed that the consideration paid for his policy was
less than $50,000, so the Texas Act should not apply. Stewart argued,
without any authority for its position, that the court should look to the
coverage limit of the policy, $160,000, not the premium paid. The court
disagreed.' 73 Stewart then argued that the court should enforce the arbi-
tration provision under common law. The court held that, unless the
Texas Act applied, it had no jurisdiction. 74 An interlocutory appeal is
available only under the Texas Act.
The Federal Act applies only to contracts in interstate commerce. 175
The court held that it was Stewart's burden to show that the contract was
in interstate commerce. 176 A party seeking to compel arbitration must
establish its right to arbitrate under the Federal Act. The only evidence
of interstate commerce here was that Stewart did business in several
states. That was not a sufficient effect on interstate commerce. 177 When
the only evidence of interstate commerce was that one of the parties in
the underlying suit was a corporation doing business in several states, it
has been held interstate commerce was not affected and the arbitration
agreement did not fall under the terms of the federal act. 178
169. TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. §§ 171.001 (Vernon 1997).
170. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (1994).
171. See TEX. Civ. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 171.017(a)(1) (Vernon 1997).
172. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 171.001(b) (Vernon 1997).
173. See Mack, 945 S.W.2d at 332.
174. See id.
175. See Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 483, 489 (1987); Anglin, 842 S.W.2d at 269-70.
176. See Mack, 945 S.W.2d at 332.
177. See id. at 333.
178. See id. (citing Porter & Clements, L.L.P. v. Stone, 935 S.W.2d 217, 218 (Tex.
App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1996, no writ)).
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